The Immateriality of the Soul and Personal Identity
Both in his discussion of personal identity and in his discussion of the immateriality of the soul in Book IV of the
EssayLocke is agnostic about the immateriality of the soul. In Book IV he suggests that immateriality is not needed for the great ends of religion, and in Book II he crafts a theory of personal identity that does not require (though it is not inconsistent with) the immateriality of the soul.
The Immateriality of the Soul
In giving us his estimate of the limits of human understanding, Locke made some claims which surprised his contemporaries. In IV 3, 6 he suggests that given our ignorance of substances, it was possible that God could make matter fitly disposed think. He suggested that it was no farther beyond our comprehension that motions of the body could give rise to pleasure and pain than that an immaterial soul could feel pain after the occurrence of some motions in the body. He suggested that the immateriali
“Person … is a forensic term” | Locke on Personal Identity ...
Locke rejects the following three views, which suggest that personhood is preserved by (a) same matter, (b) same organism, and (c) same soul: Of material substances: First, Locke rejects sameness of material substance as the thing that makes someone the same person over time: Clearly if I lose a material part, I continue to be the same person.
John Locke & Personal Identity | Issue 157 - Philosophy Now
According to Locke, the past identity of a person reaches as far as their consciousness can be extended back to any past action or thought.
| john locke philosophy |
At the very least, it can be said that Locke challenges the importance that many philosophers place on the immaterial soul to personhood and. |
| what is personal identity in philosophy |
Locke’s discussion of persons received much attention from his contemporaries, ignited a heated debate over personal identity, and continues to influence and inform the debate over persons and their persistence conditions. |
| john locke psychology contributions |
“Certain capacities—perhaps rational thought or exhibiting complex emotions—might be sufficient to cross the threshold of personhood,” she. |
Locke’s psychological theory of personal identity
According to Locke, the past identity of a person reaches as far as their consciousness can be extended back to any past action or thought. Locke on Personal Identity - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
'My view is that Locke links a moral account of personhood (rather than a moral account of personal identity) with a psychological account of personal. Personal Identity and Ethics - Stanford Encyclopedia of ...
Philosophers John Locke and Anne Finch Conway don’t exactly agree on the answers to some essential philosophical questions: What is a person?
Personhood: An Essential Characteristic of the Human Species
Though the distinction between man and person is controversial, Locke's distinction between the soul or the thing which thinks in us and consciousness is even more radical.